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1  Statement of the issues
On 29 July 2008, Judge Prinsloo of the Pretoria High Court handed down 
judgement in the case of Von Abo v Government of the RSA (hereafter Von 
Abo).1 The judgment was well received in the South African media, even 
earning Judge Prinsloo an award as Legalbrief Newsmaker of the month.2
Certainly one of the reasons for the attention received by the case was that 
it concerned the situation in Zimbabwe and, as a consequence, placed South 
Africa’s policy regarding Zimbabwe in the spotlight. It is of particular interest 
that judgement was handed down in the midst of political talks between the main 
political parties in Zimbabwe. But, from an international and constitutional law 
perspective, the case was significant for its treatment of the right to diplomatic 
protection and more generally, the discretion of states in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. Can the state be compelled by a court to perform certain international 
acts impacting on foreign relations and under what circumstances?
For a long time these questions – linked as they were to the act of state 
doctrine – were cloudier than a British summer. When the Constitutional 
Court handed down its judgment in Kaunda v the President of the Republic 
of South Africa (hereafter Kaunda),3 I felt that the issues had become clearer.4 
* This paper expresses the personal views of the author  Nothing in this paper is to be attributed to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs or the Government of the Republic of South Africa
1 [2008] JOL 22219 (T)
2 Leon “Von Abo Ruling exposes empty promises on Zimbabwe” Business Day (11-08-2008) http://
www businessday co za/Articles/TarkArticle aspx?ID=3290752 (accessed 12-11-2008); “Government 
didn’t protect FS farmer” News24 (29-07-2008) http://www news24 com/News24/South_Africa/
Politics/0,,2-7-12_2366259,00 html (accessed 30-07-2008); Pretorius “Landmark win for farmer: Court 
says man who lost land, business in Zim is entitled to SA Government Protection” Pretoria News (30-07-
2008) http://www pretorianews co za/index php?fSectionId=1703&fSearch=1&fQuery=%93Landmark+
win+for+farmer%3A+Court+says+man+who+lost+land%2C+business+in+Zim+is+entitled+to+SA+Go
vernment+Protection%94 (accessed 08-11-2008)  
3 2005 4 SA 235 (CC)  A similar question was raised in Van Zyl v the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa 2008 3 SA 294
4 The author’s favourable views of Kaunda are set out in Tladi & Dlagnekova “The Act of State Doctrine in 
South Africa: Has Kaunda settled a vexing question?” 2007 SA Public Law 444. For criticism of Kaunda 
see eg Olivier “Diplomatic Protection – Right or Privilege?” 2005 SAYIL 238; Woolman “Application” 
in Woolman, Roux & Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006) 31-114 et seq. Woolman’s 
critique of Kaunda is focused less on the question of diplomatic protection and more on the extraterrito-
rial application of the Bill of Rights  
However, in light of Kaunda and the progress it represented, it was with some 
disquiet that I read the Von Abo judgement. The decision relies heavily on 
Kaunda and yet reaches conclusions (and gives an order) that is apparently at 
odds with that judgement. It is this paradox that this paper seeks to explore. 
Given the sensitivity of the issues involved, it is also appropriate to emphasise 
that this paper is not about the correctness of the land policies in Zimbabwe 
or South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe. The question is simply whether 
Von Abo is consistent with Kaunda. Over and above my admiration for the 
decision in Kaunda, this case will be used as a benchmark against which to 
evaluate Von Abo because, as a decision handed down by the Constitutional 
Court, it constitutes the current law on the matter – this is true especially of 
the majority judgement. In addition, in the course of the analysis, it is impos-
sible to ignore the (laudable) objectives of those seeking to develop a right to 
diplomatic protection.
The next section commences with a very brief overview of the facts in Von 
Abo and the order given by the Court. In doing so, a few remarks are made 
about the adequacy of the government’s response to Mr Von Abo’s request 
for diplomatic protection and the presentation of evidence to the Court. This 
brief overview of the facts and order in Von Abo is followed by an exposition 
of the Kaunda judgment in the context of the right to diplomatic protection. 
Thereafter an analysis is provided of the decision of the High Court in Von 
Abo in the context of the Kaunda judgement. A few words about the laudable 
objectives behind the promotion of a right to diplomatic protection are then 
followed by some concluding remarks.
2  The facts and order in Von Abo
The judgement handed down by Prinsloo J in Von Abo is, with respect, 
incorrect on a number of levels. But it is appropriate to begin by highlighting 
that the decision was correct in one respect: in light of the facts before him, 
Prinsloo J had no option but to find against the government. However, the 
reasoning of the judgment, and especially the order granted, is problematic. 
It may also be added in passing that the same can be said of the tone of the 
judgement, which could lead one, rightly or wrongly, to suspect that it was a 
protest against government policies towards Zimbabwe – policies which are 
pejoratively termed as “quiet diplomacy”. For example, the Court states that 
the government’s “feeble efforts, if any, amounted to little more than acquies-
cence in the conduct of their Zimbabwean counterparts and their ‘war veteran’ 
thugs”.5 Elsewhere, again referring to the government, the Court states that 
they did not show the will “to do anything constructive to bring their northern 
neighbour to book.”6 But this aspect of the judgement is beyond the scope of 
this comment.
5 Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JOL 22219 (T) para 112  
6 Para 143
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The facts, briefly, are that mr von Abo acquired ownership in land and other 
property in Zimbabwe over a long period of time.7 It also appears from the 
facts that Mr Von Abo created a number of legal entities including companies 
and a trust and, for his benefit, registered the properties in the name of the 
companies. For purposes of brevity, and to borrow the language of the Court, 
over the years Mr Von Abo was able to build himself a “considerable farming 
empire in Zimbabwe”.8
A large part of the historical (and perhaps current) background of Von Abo 
relates to the political and economic disintegration that can be traced to the late 
1990s in Zimbabwe. This political and economic upheaval was accompanied 
by what can only be described as large scale violations of human rights and 
infringement of property interests. The Zimbabwean land policy in this time 
came to be associated with expropriation without compensation of mainly 
white-owned farms, including Mr Von Abo’s “farming empire”. I pause here 
to add, lest the issue be racialised, that the reports have shown that while 
large-scale, white farmers have suffered infringement of property interests, 
poor black people in Zimbabwe living on the land were not saved from the 
consequences of the Zimbabwean land policy, whether through violence or 
through economic hardship.
The facts in the judgement also show that Mr Von Abo tried to protect his 
legal rights in Zimbabwe, but without success. At this point it is appropriate 
to mention an important fact noted by the Court – the significance of which 
is not fully accounted for by it. In restating the facts, the Court points out that 
Mr Von Abo
“ … describes in graphic detail how he attempted, through litigation, to protect his interests with the 
assistance of the Zimbabwean courts. These efforts failed dismally, there were broken promises, court 
orders were ignored and eviction notices came flooding back, thick and fast.”9
Without a doubt, these events are recounted to show how much Mr Von 
Abo had tried to enforce his rights and, indeed, that all domestic remedies had 
been exhausted. But this statement also shows something else, which Prinsloo 
J does not factor into the judgement, namely the futility of any South African 
government action with a Zimbabwean government that refuses to listen to its 
own courts. In this regard it must be noted that diplomatic protection would 
consist mainly of diplomatic communication requesting that the unlawful act 
be remedied.10 While stronger action in the form of judicial dispute settle-
ment mechanisms and arbitration remain possible measures of diplomatic 
7 The facts are reproduced in greater detail in paras 2-17 of the judgement
8 Para 6  
9 Para 13
10 Draft Art 1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection defines diplomatic protection as the “invoca-
tion by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of 
another State” for an internationally wrongful act injurious to the former state’s national  In its commen-
tary on draft art 1, the International Law Commission (ILC) notes that “diplomatic action” would cover 
“all lawful procedures employed by a State to inform another State of its views and concerns, including 
protest, request for an inquiry or for negotiations aimed at settlement of disputes” (emphasis added)  Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries 2006 http://untreaty un org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_8_2006 pdf 27 (accessed 30-10-2008)
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protection,11 these would require the consent of both states under the current 
system of international law. But this is merely mentioned in passing. This 
factual question impacts only incidentally on the principles that are relevant 
to this article.
The facts as recounted in the Court’s judgment show that Mr Von Abo 
began requesting diplomatic protection from the South African government 
in 2002. In his request for diplomatic protection, Mr Von Abo envisaged that 
the government would either accede to the International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) so that he could pursue a claim 
against Zimbabwe under the rules of the ICSID; or would conclude a bilateral 
investment promotion and protection agreement with Zimbabwe; or would 
enter into diplomatic discussions with Zimbabwe on his behalf.
From the facts, it appears that the government did not respond to Mr Von 
Abo’s request for diplomatic protection, or at best, did so insufficiently. From 
the facts, no reasons were ever given to Mr Von Abo to explain the unwill-
ingness or inability to take up his cause with the government of Zimbabwe, 
to ratify the ICSID or to enter into a bilateral investment promotion and 
 protection agreement with Zimbabwe. The only evidence before the Court 
regarding what the government had done for mr von Abo was an affidavit 
by a state law adviser which was rightly struck out as hearsay evidence. The 
facts before the Court, therefore, painted a picture of a government which had 
simply ignored its citizen’s plea for help.
The Court also had on record statements by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to Parliament in response to questions from opposition parties that 
the government was in the process of negotiating an investment protection 
agreement with Zimbabwe. With no evidence to support this, Prinsloo J 
was justified in concluding that the statements of the minister were untrue. 
Subsequent to the Von Abo decision, evidence indeed appeared of South 
Africa’s efforts, not solely for the benefit of mr von Abo but to assist South 
African landowners generally in Zimbabwe. Specific meetings could now be 
recalled between South African representatives and Zimbabwean authorities 
regarding the seizure of South African farms. Supporting documents to 
that effect were also produced – facts which could have had an effect on the 
Court’s decision.12 In addition, it appeared that the Minister had not misled 
Parliament. Indeed, there were on-going negotiations for a bilateral investment 
protection agreement, which was never signed because the parties could not 
reach agreement on some significant clauses.13 It therefore appeared that the 
11 The ILC states that other peaceful means “embraces all forms of lawful dispute settlement, from nego-
tiation, mediation and conciliation to arbitral and judicial dispute settlement ” Draft Articles 2006 27  
While the First Report of the Special Rapporteur included such tougher measures as reprisals, retorsions 
and economic measures, their non-inclusion in the final commentary to the Draft Articles is probably a 
reflection of the lack of support, or at least uncertainty, about such far-reaching measures in actions of 
diplomatic protection  
12 Subsequent to the decision in Von Abo, an internal “post mortem” meeting was held to consider what 
had gone wrong  Several officials produced a number of telexes (communication documents) from the 
High Commission, informing Head of Office of meetings held between Zimbabwean officials and South 
African officials in Harare  
13 The Department of Trade and Industry, the line function department responsible for investment and trade 
treaties, has subsequently provided information in this regard  
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lack of evidence before the Court was due to poor record-keeping and poor 
coordination rather than unwillingness on the part of the government to offer 
diplomatic protection. To be true, all the revelations about what government 
had done came out in internal discussions which, in a court of law, would 
still require substantiation. In any event, this is water under the bridge. Judge 
Prinsloo did not have this information and was, accordingly, justified in 
concluding that the government had simply ignored Mr Von Abo’s request for 
assistance and had not considered the request rationally and in good faith. If 
there is a silver lining to the Court’s decision, it may be that it will lead to better 
record-keeping and greater cooperation between government departments in 
dealing with similar cases.
On the basis of this lack of evidence, the Court made the following order:14
(i) The failure of the government to rationally and in good faith decide 
and deal with Von Abo’s request is a violation of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”);15
(ii) Von Abo “[had] a right to diplomatic protection from” the government;16
(iii) The government has an “obligation to provide diplomatic protection”;17 
and
(iv) The government must “take all necessary steps to have the applicant’s 
violations of his rights by the Government of Zimbabwe remedied.”18
Accepting that the government did not deal with Von Abo’s request in an 
appropriate manner and did not manage the court case prudently in terms 
of the provision of evidence, the question which has to be considered in this 
article is whether the Von Abo decision, and in particular the order, is correct 
in law. As indicated earlier, it is especially important to determine whether 
this decision consistent with Kaunda.
It is submitted that the decision reached in Von Abo is flawed in several 
respects. First, the order is overbroad and goes beyond what was provided for 
in Kaunda. Second, the judgement is not sufficiently reasoned, particularly in 
so far as it relates to the order. In other words, it is points (ii)-(iv) of the order 
as reflected above, and not point (i), that is at issue here. I turn now to briefly 
describe the decision in Kaunda.
3  Kaunda and the right to diplomatic protection19
While the Kaunda decision was welcomed, at least by this author, for its 
clarity, its exposition of the law was not groundbreaking. Rather, Kaunda built 
14 Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JOL 22219 (T)
15 Para 161
16 Para 161 (emphasis added)
17 Para 161 (emphasis added)
18 Para 161 (emphasis added)
19 This brief exposition of the decision in Kaunda based is largely on Tladi and Dlagnekova 2007 SA Public 
Law 444  For a more disapproving reading of Kaunda, see Olivier 2005 SAYIL 252 who describes the 
decision in Kaunda as follows:
   “[ironically], the courts’ approach seems to be much in line with the executive’s style of silent diplomacy 
and non-prescription when it comes to human rights abuses by one of the foreign states in question”
 See also Coombs “Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa” 2005 AJIL 681
18 STELL LR 2009 1
on previous decisions and applied the law relating to the justiciability of state 
conduct in the area of foreign affairs as developed over the years to the ques-
tion whether individuals have a right to diplomatic protection and whether 
the state has a corresponding duty to provide such diplomatic protection.20 
The approach consistently adopted by the courts leading up to Kaunda has 
been two-pronged. On the one hand, the courts emphasised the discretion 
of the executive in the conduct of foreign relations. On the other hand, the 
courts expressed the idea that even in the conduct of foreign relations, the 
executive is obliged to obey the commands of the Constitution.21 Thus, even at 
the time of Kaunda, the need to maintain a balance between the discretion to 
be afforded to the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs and the impera-
tive to be faithful to the Constitution had been embodied in constitutional 
jurisprudence.
The majority judgement in Kaunda was handed down by Chaskalson CJ, 
with concurring judgements by Ngcobo J and Sachs J, and a dissenting judge-
ment by O’Regan J.22 The majority judgement began by setting out, with 
reference to the Barcelona Traction case,23 the customary international law 
position that the right to diplomatic protection is a right of states and that 
there is no legal obligation on states to take diplomatic protection measures on 
behalf of its nationals.24 The Court then considered whether recent develop-
ments within the United Nations, in particular the development of the Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006, may have given birth to such a duty 
on governments.25 The Court concludes, correctly, that it has not.26 The Court 
then asserted, again correctly, that notwithstanding the positive obligation 
which section 7(2) of the Constitution imposes on the state “to respect, pro-
tect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill of Rights, these rights do not 
attach to nationals outside South Africa.27
In Kaunda much was made about extraterritoriality of the South African 
Constitution, that is that the rights in the Bill of Rights did not apply beyond 
our borders. However, in light of the fact that the decision in Von Abo did not 
postulate that the state should act to protect Mr Von Abo’s property rights 
under the Constitution, it is unnecessary to evaluate the Court’s treatment of 
20 See eg Kolbatschenko v King NO and Another 2001 4 SA 336 (CC); Mohamed v President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2001 3 SA 893 (CC); Geuking v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 3 SA 34 
(CC)  See for discussion Tladi & Dlagnekova 2007 SA Public Law 444  
21 This line of reasoning can be traced back to the Constitutional Court’s decision in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC)
22 A good summary of all the judgements in Kaunda is provided in Coombs 2005 AJIL 681 and Olivier 2005 
SAYIL 238  
23 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Ltd (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ Reports 
3
24 Kaunda v the President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para 23
25 Paras 25-27  
26 Para 27  In 2006, during the adoption of the Draft Articles, the overwhelming majority of states in the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly questioned the inclusion of a Draft Article on the right (of 
nationals) to diplomatic protection, even when couched in inspirational rather than prescriptive language  
This is an indication of the extent to which states are generally uncomfortable with the notion of a right of 
individuals to diplomatic protection
27 Para 32
THE RIgHT To dIPLomATIC PRoTECTIon 19
this issue.28 However, it might be worthwhile to reflect briefly – and certainly 
without engaging in a comprehensive analysis – on criticism levelled at 
Kaunda’s treatment of extraterritoriality. Stuart Woolman, who regards 
the judgement in Kaunda to be flawed and “a retreat” from the progress 
in Mohamed,29 opines that the flaw in Kaunda (as far as extraterritoriality 
is concerned) flows from the Court conflating two issues. These are the 
extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights to the South African state, and 
the extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights to foreign law.30 The critical 
distinction, as I understand Woolman’s analysis, is that in the former case, it 
is the South African state which is bound by the Bill of Rights, while the 
second scenario would seek to subject foreign law (and through it the foreign 
state) to the South African Constitution.31 My reading of Kaunda is that the 
extraterritoriality it rejects is the latter type, that is subjecting foreign law to 
the South African Constitution. In other words, I do not read Kaunda to imply 
that when in Zimbabwe the South African government can act inconsistently 
with the Constitution, but rather that in Zimbabwe, it is the Zimbabwean law 
that applies and therefore one cannot argue that the Zimbabwean government 
has violated a South African national’s rights to life, property or a fair trial 
under the South African Constitution. And it is precisely this fact which 
makes the right to diplomatic protection different from the application of the 
Bill of Rights. With diplomatic protection, it is international human rights law 
(or in any event, wrongful conduct under international law), and not rights 
contained in the South African Bill of Rights that are at issue. As Olivier 
correctly observes, the Court’s approach in Kaunda shows that there should 
be
“ … conceptual differentiation between the extraterritorial application of the Constitution on the one 
hand, and the operation of multilateral human rights instrument and obligations … It is a mistake 
commonly made in South African human rights jurisprudence for the raison d’etre for international 
law to be sought in the South African Constitution.”32
With respect to the right to diplomatic protection in South African law, the 
Court first noted that “there is no enforceable right to diplomatic protection”.33 
South African citizens, however, “are entitled to request South Africa for 
protection under international law against wrongful acts of a foreign state.”34 
According to the Court, the entitlement of South African citizens to request 
diplomatic protection from the government against the actions of another 
state flows from the rights of citizenship as provided for in section 3 of the 
Constitution.35 The Chief Justice then stated the crux of his judgement as 
follows:
28 For an analysis of the treatment of extraterritoriality in Kaunda, see Woolman “Application” in 
Constitutional Law 31-117 and especially 31-118  
29 Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 3 SA 893 (CC)
30 Woolman “Application” in Constitutional Law 31-118
31 31-119 et seq. 
32 Olivier 2005 SAYIL 241
33 Kaunda v the President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para 61 (emphasis added)
34 Para 61. By wrongful acts, here, the Court refers to internationally wrongful acts, or acts that are in breach 
of international law  
35 Para 62
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“If, as I have held, citizens have a right to request government to provide them with diplomatic protec-
tion, then the government must have a corresponding obligation to consider the request and deal with 
it consistently with the Constitution.”36
The Court then held that a decision to refuse a request to protect a national 
“against gross abuse of international human rights norms” is justiciable.37 
However, in such circumstances courts cannot tell a government how to make 
diplomatic intervention.38 In particular, the Court stated that a
“decision as to whether protection should be given, and if so, what, is an aspect of foreign policy 
which is essentially the function of the Executive. The timing of representations if they are to be 
made, the language in which they are to be made, and the sanctions (if any) which are to follow if such 
representations are rejected are matters with which courts are ill-equipped to deal.”39
That the courts are ill-equipped to deal with such questions does not mean 
that it has no “jurisdiction to deal with such matters”.40 In the view of the 
Court, irrationality and bad faith would provide grounds for the review of 
the government’s decision to refuse diplomatic protection. If the government 
deals with a matter “in bad faith or irrationally, a court may require govern-
ment to deal with the matter properly”.41 Chaskalson CJ then concluded with 
the following words of warning (no doubt addressed to over-eager judges):
“What needs to be stressed, however, in the light of some of the submissions made to us in this case, is 
that government has a broad discretion in such matters which must be respected by our courts.”42
As stated earlier, the decision of the Court in Kaunda is coherent and clear. 
While due regard must be given to Coombs’s implicit warning concerning 
the “cost” associated with requiring the state to give reasons, it is equally 
reassuring that the courts strike a fine balance between the executive’s 
obligation and its wide discretion.
Although the court in Von Abo was bound by the majority judgement of 
Chaskalson CJ, it is worth recalling a few salient points of the other three 
judgements in Kaunda. While it is true that they have a number of important 
points in common, I would not, as Sachs J does, go as far as to say that all the 
judgements “are compatible with” the majority judgement.43 The judgements 
have in common the striking of the balance between the obligation on the 
executive to comply with the Constitution and the wide discretion that must 
be afforded to the executive in matters relating to foreign affairs.44 While 
the judgement of Sachs J itself does not mention this point, it appears to be 
assumed. The judgements also have in common the idea that, based on sec-
tion 3 of the Constitution, some duty exists on the government in relation to 




39 Para 77 (emphasis added)
40 Para 78
41 Para 80 (emphasis added)
42 Para 81
43 Para 275
44 See para 210 per Ngcobo J and para 245 per O’Regan J
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As stated above, according to the majority judgment, the duty on the state 
is to consider a request for diplomatic protection rationally and in good faith. 
However, the dissenting judgement of O’Regan J provides that there is an 
obligation on government “to provide diplomatic protection to its citizens 
to prevent or repair egregious breaches of international human rights law 
norms.”45 This goes well beyond what is provided for in the majority judgement. 
Ngcobo J’s judgement, however, falls somewhere between the more subtle 
duty, imposed by the majority, to consider a request for diplomatic protection 
rationally and in good faith and ‘the duty to provide diplomatic protection’ 
conclusion of O’Regan J. Ngcobo J, to start off with, uses the language of 
the majority and asserts that in his view, the duty on the government “is to 
properly consider the request for diplomatic protection.”46 Elsewhere in the 
judgement, Ngcobo J states that where a citizen requests diplomatic protection 
in relation to a right to a fair trial, the government “has a constitutional duty 
to grant such protection”.47 The apparent disjuncture between the duty to 
provide diplomatic protection and the duty to consider a request for diplomatic 
protection rationally and in good faith is explained at the end of the judgement 
as follows:
“[Under the Constitution] the government has a constitutional duty to grant diplomatic protection 
to nationals abroad against violations or threatened violations of fundamental international human 
rights. This duty entails an obligation to consider properly the request for diplomatic protection”.48
4  An analysis of Von Abo in the context of Kaunda
4 1  General Approach to Sources and Methodology
As mentioned earlier, the Von Abo decision is wrong on various levels. 
Before delving into the substantive aspects of the decision, one general com-
ment needs to be made concerning the reasoning and methodology applied 
in Von Abo. For a decision which is so far-reaching, one would expect a fully 
reasoned judgement supported by relevant authority. A thorough examination 
of the law in general, and the Kaunda judgment and applicable international 
law principles in particular, would have made the decision, whatever the out-
come, more acceptable. But the examination of the various legal principles 
is not sufficiently deep, especially taking into account the importance of the 
question, to warrant the apparent departure from Kaunda. The judgement 
quotes large extracts from the Kaunda majority, dissenting and concurring 
judgements, mixes them together in a potpourri approach and then declares 
an outcome. The congruence between this outcome and Kaunda is assumed 
and therefore never properly examined. The differences, if any, between the 
majority, the minority and the concurring judgements in Kaunda are never 
explored. The nuances and implications of Kaunda are not considered in any 
45 Para 238
46 Para 192 (emphasis added)
47 Para 197
48 Para 210
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meaningful way or in any depth. The issues which are raised in the following 
paragraphs are not concerned with substance but rather with methodology.
The manner in which the Court refers to the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection, 2006 adopted by the International Law Commission (the ILC) 
is symptomatic of the failure of the Court to consider the sources carefully. 
In reference to the Draft Articles, the Court states that the “rule [relating to 
local remedies] has now been codified in article 10 of the International Law 
Commission’s Rules on Exhaustion of Local Remedies”.49 This reference is 
troubling for two reasons. First, the ILC has never worked on the topic of 
exhaustion of local remedies and certainly never produced any “rules” on 
it. Secondly, notwithstanding that the ILC mandate is the codification and 
progressive development of international law, the work of the Commission 
is not in and of itself codification, at least not in the sense that the product 
can be regarded as binding law. Again, the point here is not that there is not 
such a rule in international law, for surely there is, but only that the method of 
citation is, at best, misleading and does not take into account the basic nature 
of international law.
Another example of the Court’s failure to examine sufficiently both the law 
and the legal principles relevant to the resolution of the dispute relates to the 
manner in which it treats the right to property as a human right under custom-
ary international law.50 Expropriation without compensation is, without doubt, 
a violation of international law. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the right to property is a human right under customary international law.51 It 
must be recalled that in Kaunda the focus is on violations of customary inter-
national human rights law and not rights in the South African Constitution.52 
It is interesting in this regard that John Dugard, a leading champion of the 
individual’s right to diplomatic protection, has sought to assert the right to 
diplomatic protection in the context of ius cogens (peremptory norms) and 
49 Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JOL 22219 (T) para 85
50 Para 71 et seq. 
51 While the Universal Declaration on Human Rights contains such a right, the right is not included in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  For an interesting debate in this regard, see 
Petersmann “Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for integrating Human Rights into the Law 
of the World Wide organization: Lessons from the European Integration” 2002 EJIL 621 and Alston 
“Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann” 2002 
EJIL 815  In the latter article, Alston, co-author of the renowned standard international human rights law 
text International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals, laments Petersmann’s conflation 
of ‘liberty rights’, ‘contractual freedom’ and ‘property rights’, amongst others, as human rights  It may be 
added in this regard that Dugard International Law – A South African Perspective 3 ed (2005) 299, who 
is quoted extensively by Prinsloo J and who is a leading proponent of the national’s right to diplomatic 
protection concept, does not, in his treatment of expropriation, conceptualise property rights as part of 
international human rights but rather as part of “traditional international law, as formulated by capital 
exporting countries”  
52 Kaunda v the President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para 64, where Chaskalson 
CJ describes those actions for which the government will not be expected to be passive as amounting to 
the “material infringement of a human right that forms part of customary international law”  While the 
concurring judgement of Ngcobo J (para 160 et seq) and the dissenting judgement of O’Regan J (which 
speaks of “egregious violations” of international human rights (para 238)) do not make it clear whether it 
is human rights found in treaty law or customary international law that are at stake, the majority judge-
ment is clear in this regard  The judgement of Sachs J appears even narrower in this regard, in that he 
specifically refers to “torture, grossly unfair trials and capital punishment” as the violations to which he 
is referring (para 275)
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not in any violation of international law.53 It must be emphasised that it is not 
argued here that the right to property is not a human right under customary 
international law, only that it is not a fact to be assumed lightly. It is a right 
which, if relied upon, needs to be substantiated by proving the elements of 
customary international law, namely usus and opinio iuris.54 However, if the 
view of the Court was that an applicant need not rely on customary inter-
national human rights law, but on specific human rights treaties such as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, then we would need to be 
referred to the specific human rights treaty and an allegation that the conduct 
in question was a violation of that treaty.55
The point above is that the nature of the judgement required significant 
justification. Instead of deliberative arguments and reasoning to support the 
far-reaching conclusions, too much time is spent in the Von Abo judgement on 
political facts which, true though they may be, cannot on their own dispose 
of the complex legal principles at play. However, these are technical issues. 
The decision in Von Abo also raises substantive issues about the nature of the 
citizen’s rights in relation to diplomatic protection. To these issues we will 
now turn.
4 2  The Right to Diplomatic Protection
As highlighted above, the Court declared in its order that Mr Von Abo has 
a right to diplomatic protection and that the government has a corresponding 
obligation to provide diplomatic protection. Moreover, the Court provided that 
the government must “take all necessary steps to have the applicant’s viola-
tions of his rights by [Zimbabwe] remedied”.56 This is contrary to Kaunda in 
two respects.
First, in Kaunda the Court held that a citizen, like Mr Von Abo, has a right 
to request diplomatic protection and that the government has a duty to con-
sider the request rationally and in good faith. Secondly, the Constitutional 
Court held that the government, because of the nature of the playing arena, 
namely foreign relations, has a wide discretion – both in whether to grant 
diplomatic protection and in the manner of effecting diplomatic protection. 
On both counts the judgement in Von Abo goes beyond these findings with 
53 Dugard “The Future of International Law: A Human Rights Perspective – with some Comments on the 
Leiden School of International Law” 2007 LJIL 729 732
54 See Dugard International Law 29 et seq.
55 Bearing in mind that my comments at this stage relate only to methodology, it is interesting to contrast 
the approach adopted by the Pretoria High Court in Von Abo with the two judgements that are more sym-
pathetic to the ‘right to diplomatic protection project’ in Kaunda, namely those of Ngcobo J and O’Regan 
J  While the latter two judgements go to lengths to justify the conclusion that a fundamental human right 
in international law is at stake in the case before them, the Pretoria High Court does not even begin to 
engage with this rather complex question  It seems to be assumed  It is this unwillingness to engage in the 
issue that is the source of the problem  
56 Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JOL 22219 (T) para 161 (emphasis added)  For purposes of 
comparison, see O’Regan J’s judgement in Kaunda which, though finding a right to diplomatic protec-
tion, nevertheless proposed an order which still leaves much discretion for the state  O’Regan J held that 
she would order the government “to take appropriate steps to provide diplomatic protection” (para 271), 
whereas the Von Abo judgment requires that government take “all necessary steps to have the applicant’s 
violation of his rights by the Government of Zimbabwe” (para 161 emphasis added)  
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regards to the order provided. There is, in a sense, a leap of logic. The argu-
ment that follows hereunder is essentially that the judgement fails to link the 
right to request (and the corresponding duty to consider) on the one hand, and 
the right to diplomatic protection (and the duty provide it) on the other.
I pause here to clarify what, in the light of the facts and Kaunda, the Court 
could and probably should have held. The Court should have held that the 
government had failed, as it was constitutionally obliged to do, to rationally 
consider the request of Mr Von Abo. Consequently, it should have ordered 
the government to go back and consider the request rationally and in good 
faith and to provide to the Court, within 60 days (or even 30 days), its deci-
sion, reasons and any steps it had taken or intended to take to remedy its own 
violations and not, as suggested by the Court, the violations perpetrated by 
the government of Zimbabwe. The taking of property is a violation of interna-
tional law by Zimbabwe. The South African government cannot remedy this 
as suggested by the Court in Von Abo. What the government can (and should) 
remedy is its own violation of not considering, rationally and in good faith, the 
request by Mr Von Abo.
While the Court quotes extensively from Kaunda, the apparent conflict 
between the order made and the majority finding in Kaunda is neither explained 
nor explored. In particular, it is not made clear how the Court arrives at the 
conclusion that there is a right to diplomatic protection when Chaskalson CJ’s 
judgement in Kaunda clearly states the contrary.57 The Pretoria High Court 
does not explain the shift from the right of citizens to request diplomatic pro-
tection and the duty of the government to consider such a request rationally 
and in good faith (Kaunda), to the right of citizens to diplomatic protection and 
the corresponding duty on the government to provide diplomatic protection – 
both of which are stated in absolute terms (Von Abo). This is a big jump which 
cannot be made without justification. In light of the Von Abo judgement, it is 
also not clear what remains of the wide discretion of the executive to which 
reference is made in all the judgements in Kaunda.
Although it is argued here that the decision in Von Abo is in conflict with 
Kaunda, the possibility of some form of reconciliation between these cases 
cannot be excluded. However, to do this would require more substantiation 
than the Court has offered. In particular, the shift from a right to request 
diplomatic protection to a right to diplomatic protection would require sub-
stantiation. The Court does not provide any reasons for this leap. It can be 
speculated that one reason could be that the government had had their oppor-
tunity to consider the request rationally and in good faith, but had missed the 
opportunity to do so, and that the Court consequently was entitled to order 
it to provide diplomatic protection. The second possibility is that the Court 
simply did not trust the government to go back and consider the request of Mr 
von Abo in good faith. Beyond these two reasons, it is difficult to find any 
other possible explanation for the Court’s apparent departure from Kaunda. I 
turn now to consider both possible explanations in turn.
57 Kaunda v the President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para 60  
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The first possible explanation, simply put, implies that the right to request 
diplomatic protection and the duty to consider such a request automatically 
transforms into a right to diplomatic protection and a duty to provide 
diplomatic protection where the government does not rationally consider the 
request. In essence, if one were to accept this view, Von Abo is not a departure 
from Kaunda but simply a reflection of the natural progression of the rights 
as provided for in Kaunda – the logical conclusion of Kaunda. This is not 
an implausible argument, but it is not self-evident, and would require some 
justification in the light of Kaunda. In particular, such an argument would 
need to overcome an obstacle placed by the express words in the majority 
judgement in Kaunda:
“If the Government refuses to consider a legitimate request or deals with it in bad faith or irrationally, 
a court can require Government to deal with the matter properly.”58
This means that if the government fails to consider a request rationally or 
deals with it in bad faith, a court can order the government to apply its mind 
rationally to the decision. In this regard the Court in Kaunda emphasises that 
its judgement “does not mean that courts [can] substitute their opinion for 
that of the government or order the government to provide a particular form 
of diplomatic protection”59 – which is precisely what the Court in Von Abo 
did. Ngcobo J, whose judgement, as suggested earlier, appeared more sym-
pathetic to the right to diplomatic protection than the majority judgement, 
reaches the following conclusion about the consequences of government’s 
failure to consider a request for diplomatic protection rationally and in good 
faith:
“Thus where the government were, contrary to its constitutional duty, to refuse to consider whether 
to exercise diplomatic protection, it would be appropriate for a Court to make a mandatory order 
directing the government to give consideration to the request. If this amounts to an intrusion into the 
conduct of foreign policy, it is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself.”60
This extract from Ngcobo J’s judgement is clear and unambiguous. 
Where the government has failed or refused to properly consider a request, 
the function of a court would not be to order the government to provide 
diplomatic protection but rather to order the government to go back and 
consider the request rationally and in good faith. In this regard, the judgement 
in Von Abo appears to affirm o’Regan’s dissenting judgement in Kaunda, 
which holds that there is a right to diplomatic protection, and rejects the 
majority judgement.
Indeed, even leaving aside the fact that this is a foreign affairs matter where 
the courts have consistently emphasised a wide discretion, the very nature 
of the application by Mr Von Abo was an application for the review of the 
decision of the government. The primary remedy for review is the setting 
aside of the decision and remitting it to the decision-maker because courts 
58 Para 80
59 Para 79
60 Para 193 (emphasis added)
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should not easily usurp the powers of the executive.61 This is not to say that 
courts can never correct an earlier decision or substitute the decision of the 
executive with its own decision. However, this can only be done in exceptional 
circumstances. These exceptional circumstances exist when the end result is a 
foregone conclusion, where a delay would cause the applicant significant dam-
age, where the original decision-maker exhibited bias or where the court is as 
well qualified as the original decision-maker to make the particular decision.62 
It is not clear that any of these factors, developed through case law, would 
apply to the Von Abo case. In any event, at the very least, if Prinsloo J had this 
in mind, he needed to justify the conclusion that this was an exceptional case 
necessitating substitution. He did not do so.
The second possible reason to explain the Court’s decision could be that it 
simply did not trust the government to consider the request rationally and in 
good faith. After all, the Court had already suggested that the South African 
government was complicit in the wrongful actions of Zimbabwe.63 One 
certainly hopes that this is not the reason, as it takes us into dangerous terrain 
that could threaten our constitutional democracy and skew the relationship 
between the organs of state. Certainly, if having been ordered by a court to 
consider a request rationally and in good faith within a specified time and the 
executive fails to comply, a court could find itself in the position where it is 
compelled to make the kind of order made by the Pretoria High Court – but 
even here, one hopes that the courts would do so more reluctantly than in Von 
Abo.
4 3  The evil being remedied by an extension of the right to diplomatic 
protection to South African citizens
Many South Africans praised the High Court’s judgement in Von Abo as 
a victory for human rights – hence the award of “Newsmaker of the Month” 
to Judge Prinsloo. These and other human rights-based arguments for the 
extension of the right to diplomatic protection appear to be at the heart of 
Prinsloo J’s decision. The learned judge asserted, for example, that “there are 
no remedies available to the applicant”64 and consequently that his govern-
ment must protect him. Indeed the Constitutional Court itself, in its nuanced 
judgement in Kaunda, appears to have been informed by the same sentiments 
when it stated the following:
61 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 585  Although Hoexter’s discussion is in the context 
of administrative action, there is no reason to conclude that the remedies for review are any different when 
it comes to executive decisions in accordance with the Constitution, particularly in light of Chaskalson 
CJ’s reminder in Kaunda that courts are not “to substitute their opinion” (para 79)  On the distinction 
between administrative action proper and executive action, see Hoexter Administrative Law 26 et seq. 
See also, as examples of remedies for breach of constitutional duties, Matatiele v the President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2006 5 SA 47 (CC) para 96; Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature 
v the President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 877 (CC)
62 Hoexter Administrative Law 490 et seq.
63 Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JOL 22219 (T) paras 112, 143
64 Para 86  
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“[The Applicants] are not in a position to invoke international law themselves and are obliged to seek 
state protection through the state of which they are nationals.”65
Elsewhere, Chaskalson CJ stated that “whatever theoretical disputes”66 
there may be about diplomatic protection, “it cannot be doubted that in sub-
stance the true beneficiary of the right” is the individual.67 Ngcobo J is more 
direct in this regard:
“Therefore, unless the South African government grants South African nationals abroad diplomatic 
protection, they are likely to remain without a remedy for violations of their internationally protected 
human rights.”68
These arguments, compelling though they may be, need to be carefully 
scrutinised.
Under international law, the right to diplomatic protection is a right of states, 
and not of the individual. This can lead to unfortunate circumstances if the state 
of nationality does not act. But this is precisely why the international human 
rights system has, over the last five decades, developed so rapidly to include 
individual complaints mechanisms. At least as a by-product, the human rights 
complaints mechanisms should reduce the reliance on governments to take 
up action on behalf of their nationals, particularly when taking up the matter 
would have foreign policy implications – the exact reason for the executive’s 
broad discretion when it comes to the conduct of foreign affairs. It has to be 
emphasised here that the question is not the correctness or not of the foreign 
policy but rather that the government has a right to make the policy. Indeed, 
the circumvention of these mechanisms by an over-emphasis of the right of the 
citizen to diplomatic protection may have the effect of undermining the very 
international human rights systems designed to protect those who suffer as a 
result of abuse of state action.
Ngcobo J, in Kaunda, is not unaware of this very important alternative 
and does address it, albeit in a cursory manner. He asserts that the remedies 
provided for in international human rights law are weak and at times slow.69 
It is true that the process is slow but it is not necessarily slower than trying 
to get diplomatic protection from one’s own state of nationality as Mr Von 
Abo himself can attest. If, when he began his communication with the South 
African government in 2002, Mr Von Abo had submitted a complaint either 
to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and/or the Human 
Rights Committee of the United Nations, a decision would already have 
been handed down.70 This approach puts the onus to remedy the wrongful 
conduct on the state responsible for the violation of the human right – in the 
65 Kaunda v the President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) par 61  
66 Para 64
67 Para 64
68 Para 181  In para 167, Ngcobo J asserts that “diplomatic protection is an important arsenal of human rights 
protection”  
69 Para 166
70 Of course he would need to show a violation of the right contained in the respective instruments, ie the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)  As stated earlier, the ICCPR does not contain a right to property and his claim would therefore 
be difficult (but not impossible) to substantiate before the Human Rights Committee  
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case concerning Mr Von Abo’s farms, this approach would place the onus to 
remedy the violation on the government of Zimbabwe as the perpetrator of the 
internationally wrongful act. If Mr Von Abo were to submit a complaint to the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, he would need to meet 
the admissibility requirement set out in the Charter.71 The most significant 
of these is the requirement to exhaust local remedies. It is clear from the Von 
Abo decision that the local remedies in Zimbabwe had been exhausted or, 
alternatively, did not exist.72
Second, it is not true that decisions of these bodies are necessarily weaker. 
The decisions themselves are certainly not legally binding but they are not 
without legal effect as they would indicate a violation of the instrument being 
interpreted. Thus, while a decision by the Human Rights Committee may not 
necessarily be legally binding, it is legally relevant in that it would indicate a 
violation of a right in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and therefore a breach of an international obligation which must be remedied. 
The same applies to findings of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.73 More importantly, the sentiments expressed by Ngcobo J in 
this regard are worrying in that they reflect pessimism about the international 
human rights system, and may act as a self-fulfilling prophecy contributing to 
undermining the international human rights system that so many have worked 
tirelessly to develop. The international human rights system, whether the 
African Charter or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
is designed to ensure that individuals are not left up to the mercy of their 
governments. It is principally to these mechanisms that individuals must turn 
when their rights have been violated by governments.
5  Conclusion
In terms of the test set by Chaskalson CJ in Kaunda, the decision in Von 
Abo is wrong. The Court went beyond its mandate in reviewing the actions 
of the government. While it was reasonable, under the circumstances, to find 
against the government, it was unreasonable for the Court to substitute its 
views for those of the government – especially in light of the sparse reasoning. 
In the end, this article is not about Mr Von Abo. Indeed, the correctness or 
not of the decision is unlikely to affect Mr Von Abo because it appears from 
subsequent internal government discussion that, even before the Von Abo 
decision, the government had taken up the matter of South African farms in 
Zimbabwe, although it failed to adequately communicate this to Mr Von Abo 
and certainly failed to prove this fact in court.
71 The admissibility requirements under the Charter are provided for in Art 56 of the African Charter  These 
requirements are largely similar to those required for the submission of a complaint to the Human Rights 
Committee  See Arts 1 and 2 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  
72 Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JOL 22219 (T) para 86  The jurisprudence has long held the 
view that local remedies need not be exhausted where it is “impracticable”  See eg Free Legal Assistance 
Group v Zaire (decided in 1995) (2000) African Human Rights Law Report para 37  
73 It is important to explain that, for this author, the question of the legal effect of the decisions of the Human 
Rights Committee and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is quite separate from the 
question of enforcement
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The importance of the decision lies in its potential impact on future cases 
and ensuring that the wide discretion afforded to the executive in the conduct 
of foreign affairs is not eroded by overzealousness. The Pretoria High Court’s 
decision in Von Abo, as it affects the conduct of the President, will have to be 
certified by the Constitutional Court.74 The Constitutional Court will, more 
than likely, only have to certify the first order, namely that the President failed 
in his constitutional duty to deal with Mr Von Abo’s request rationally and in 
good faith – an aspect of the judgment which is correct. If, however, the high-
est court in the land also has to pronounce on the remedies, it is hoped that the 
nuance and intellectual rigour reflected in Kaunda is maintained.
SUMMARY
Von Abo v Government of the RSA [2008] JoL 22219 (T) contains certain significant findings 
regarding the right to diplomatic protection and, more generally, the discretion of states in the conduct 
of foreign affairs. Although the court relied extensively on Kaunda v the President of the RSA 2005 4 
SA 235 (CC), it reaches conclusions and gives an order that are apparently at odds with that judgement. 
This paper seeks to explore this paradox.
74 S 167(5) of the Constitution  The hearing commenced on 29 February 2009
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